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MR. MEHTA: Hi, everyone. Welcome to the “IP in China” panel. I always find 
this to be a really interesting panel. There are a lot of issues, a lot of interesting things, a 
lot of diverse developments going on in China, and this could take many days and many 
panels to discuss. We are pleased to have a number of interesting speakers, interesting 
topics, and so much to talk about, so I want to make sure we can get to that right away.  
I will quickly introduce the panelists, and then we will go to the presentations, and 
of course we very much welcome questions from the audience. He Jing, with AnJie Law 
Firm in Beijing, will talk about the U.S.–China WTO disputes and technology transfer 
issues. Spring Chang, from Tsi & Partners in Beijing, will talk about the issue of trademark 
squatting. Jim Stronski, from Crowell & Moring in New York, will deal mostly with the 
U.S.–China dispute issues on trade secret theft. Jim Bollinger, from Troutman & Sanders 
in New York, will talk to us about the patent enforcement issues using the U.K. arbitration 
forum. Finally, Jill Ge, our panelist, will be hopefully asking tough questions of our 
speakers. 
Without further ado, let’s begin with our first panelist, He Jing. 
MR. HE: Hello, everyone. Good afternoon. It’s really great to be here. I have been 
at the Fordham Conference quite a few times. I always have the pleasure to share with 
friends the latest IP developments in China. 
This afternoon I want to talk about developments in the context of the U.S.–China 
trade dispute. The trade dispute is probably the most important thing that is going on right 
now between China and the United States. It has had an enormous impact on China’s IP 
system. Not surprisingly, many of the issues in the trade dispute are related to IP. 
To just to give you one example of the impact the trade dispute has had, essentially 
Chinese courts have de facto suspended some of the largest, most controversial lawsuits, 
like Qualcomm v. Apple,1 because the judges do not want any unintended consequences to 
arise as a result of the lawsuits. That is one easy example of the impact we are seeing. 
I want to talk about the changes that have been happening inside the U.S.–China 
trade dispute. I will give a very quick rundown of what has been happening in the last year 
or so. There are quite a few significant changes. Some of these are related to the trade 
disputes and some are really not. Some are the follow-up to reforms that China has been 
making in the IP system. 
In 2018, China established the Intellectual Property Court, a subdivision of the 
Supreme People’s Court in Beijing. The new court is China’s version of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. China has been experimenting with intermediate-level IP 
courts for the last few years. The purpose of the new court is to develop a uniform standard 
especially for patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret litigation.  
The second reform is really huge. On March 2, 2019 the State Council abolished 
several controversial provisions of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Administration of Import and Export of Technology (“TIER”) which have been at the 
center of problems for foreign IP owners when engaging in technology transfer to a Chi-
nese entity. This change opens up technology imports to more free negotiation without 
having to consider these mandatory restrictions which previously protected the Chinese 
entities in such agreements. For years people have talked about forced technology transfer 
as one of the core issues in U.S.–China trade dispute.  
Three years ago, during a negotiation between China and the United States where 
I represented an American company, I surprised everybody when I told my Chinese coun-
terparts, “I promise you all these technology transfer rules will be eliminated in five years.” 
 
1 Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 317CV00108GPCMDD, 2017 WL 3966944 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 7, 2017). 
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Three years later it was done. I was confident because I knew that technology transfer did 
not work in China. The rules said things like “licensors need to indemnify the losses of 
licensees in China” and “the improvements made by the licensee have to unconditionally 
belong to the licensee,” and we know that licensing is much more complicated than that. 
The rules disrupted technology transactions between China and the United States as well 
as the international community. They didn’t really work. 
Probably the only unfortunate thing is that this reform happened within the U.S.–
China trade dispute. The reason I say that is because people see that as being a result of 
U.S. pressure, which is not a healthy reason to make legislative changes. It would have 
been much better if China had voluntarily done that for its own sake, for its own interests. 
But what is done is done. The accusations of forced technology transfer done by the Chi-
nese government are now moot. 
Third, on January 4, 2019 the National People’s Congress of China published a list 
of amendments to China’s Patent Law proposing,2 inter alia, higher damages for patent 
infringement, more options for rewarding inventors under an employee invention remuner-
ation scheme, patent term extensions for design patents and pharmaceutical patents, and 
would allow patent linking. The change in patent term restoration arguably might have 
been due to pressure from the U.S. government as well, but let’s see what eventually will 
be put in place. Patent linkage is something we are all watching.  
There are other proposed changes in the amendment. A new article under the draft 
provides an explicit duty of good faith for both patent applicants and patentees in enforcing 
their rights. The term of a design patent was proposed to be extended from ten to fifteen 
years. In cases of willful infringement, courts will be able to increase the award of statutory 
damages by up to five times the original amount. A patentee will be able to request an ISP3 
to delete, block, or disconnect webpage links to infringing products.  
Fourth, summary judgment is something really new in China. Even though on 
paper summary judgment has been available in China for years, no one had ever tried to 
get one, including my own team of lawyers. The reason is that Chinese judges are quite 
conservative and they asked, “Can we really do this summary judgment? We always have 
the full trial and then we make a judgment about both infringement and damages. Do we 
want to experiment?”  
Finally, in March 2019, last month, some courageous judges at the Shanghai Intel-
lectual Property Court rendered a so-called “partial” or interlocutory judgment in a patent 
infringement lawsuit filed by the French automotive parts manufacturer Valeo against 
three Chinese defendants and left the damage decision to be decided in the next round. 
Another development, which is interesting and very controversial, is grants of pre-
liminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction was granted against Micron in Micron v. 
Qualcomm. In Apple v. Qualcomm, Qualcomm was able to get a preliminary injunction 
against Apple in a hotly fought patent litigation; however, that preliminary injunction was 
not really enforced.  
This is what has happened inside the context of the trade disputes. 
What just happened? When I say “just” happened, I mean within the past month, 
actually within the last week. Two things happened this week, on April 20th. 
First, a Trademark Law amendment for the first time implemented intent to use. 
An application filed without an intention to use can now be invalidated. This is the same 
 
2 See generally Tsai Lee & Chen Patent Att’ys, New Version of the Draft Amendment to 
China’s Patent Law, LEXOLOGY (May 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=71bfd1df-cac1-4cb2-8653-e9dc3bd85e76. 
3 Internet Service Provider. 
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as in the s.S. system. We were very surprised when we read it. It happened very quickly, 
within a few days. Nobody thought that would happen so quickly. Again, this is definitely 
a consequence of the trade negotiations.  
Also on April 20th, trade secret protection was enacted. China previously had trade 
secret protection under its Unfair Competition Law.4  We have been talking about the 
reforms for years. All of a sudden, the legislature changed the law. The definition of trade 
secret was expanded and the burden of proof was improved. All of this is beneficial to the 
protection of trade secrets. Again, this happened in a few days, and no doubt happened 
really because of the trade dispute. I told Probir, “Lighthizer did a better job than you.” 
Third, earlier in April the Chinese Patent Office released draft amendments of the 
Patent Examination Guidelines. One of the big changes gives a priority examination for 
products that are in the public interest or other national interests. Arguably, pharmaceutical 
companies may benefit from this change. There are also a few other changes that give more 
flexibility to patent prosecution; for example, there is now a much better way to do inter-
views with examiners. There are several good changes. 
Fourth, on March 13th, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court in China found 
Jiangling liable for unfair competition under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law in connec-
tion with the sale and manufacturing of the Landwind X7.5 The Court found that certain 
design features of the Landwind vehicle are “essentially identical” to Jaguar’s distinctive 
design features for the Evoque. Jaguar has been battling Chinese automaker Jiangling 
throughout the world over Jaguar’s assertions that Jiangling’s Landwind X7 vehicle copies 
distinctive design features of Jaguar’s Range Rover Evoque. The two sports utility vehicles 
have a similar shape, roof and windows tapering from front to back, and near-identical tail 
lights and character lines on the side paneling. 
For years Chinese automakers have been accused of using blatant or slavish copies 
in automobiles, which was quite outrageous, and foreign companies had a very hard time 
winning cases under a trade dress claim. Jaguar, a U.K. company, won in this case based 
on a trade dress claim. 
What are the measures of real change?  
I have been watching Chinese IP policy for the last twenty years, watching IP pol-
icy advocacy work in China, in addition to doing a lot of litigations and trying to enforce 
judgments in China. There are many measures of real change, but this list shows some of 
the possible changes: 
• Patent linkage/regulatory data protection is something that could be real. China’s 
top policymakers announced that two years ago. Whether they are real or not, we will have 
to watch and see. 
• A new police team is going to be critical for anti-counterfeiting and trade secret 
enforcement. China does not have an FBI-type police. Whether China can do that effec-
tively we are going watch and see. 
• Amicus briefs are coming. 
• Accepting the copyrightability of live sports broadcasts is also something that we 
are going to watch closely. It will be a big difference. 
 
4 Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, rev'd Nov. 4, 2017, effective Apr. 23, 2019) 
(China). 
5 See generally Kristin Murphy, China Court Delivers First Judgment in Favor of a 
Foreign Company Under Anti-Unfair Competition Law, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/03/28/china-court-delivers-first-judgment-in-favor-of-a-
foreign-company-under-anti-unfair-competition-law/id=107750/. 
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• Benchmarking on USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement) IP pro-
visions. 
• IP litigation with real and bigger stakes.  
• FRAND6 rate-setting in Chinese courts. 
• More and better legislative changes? (Copyright Law Amendment). 
Thank you. 
MR. MEHTA: Thanks very much. 
We have a little time for discussion and then I will throw it open after all the pan-
elists have spoken for audience questions. 
Suffice it to say I think there have been a lot of changes. The picture you paint is 
of a lot of progress being made simply in the last year or two. The initial question I have 
is, how much do you ascribe this to the United States pushing these things versus the 
interests of local Chinese companies in having these types of reforms? Do you think there 
was already a tipping point for local companies that were interested in these types of pro-
gressive IP developments, or were they more a result of external pressure? I am interested 
in the political economy dynamics. 
 MR. HE: The Trademark Law Amendment abolishing the technology transfer 
rules, the bad-faith trademark applications, and the trade secrets agenda was definitely the 
direct result of the trade negotiations. They were pushed very hard by the U.S. government. 
I think that’s why we saw those three changes. The creation of the Chinese IP Court and, I 
think actually surprisingly, the patent linkage was out of self-interest. That is very encour-
aging.  
But, unfortunately, with regard to the changes that are intertwined with the U.S.–
China trade dispute, I am concerned that, even if the amendments are passed — e.g., the 
chances that patent linkage is going to pass are quite good — if they are perceived as 
resulting from U.S. government pressure, implementation might become a big issue. 
MR. MEHTA: Great.  
Do any other panelists have any initial questions or comments? 
MR. STRONSKI: I have a question on what you think is happening now with the 
new IP Court that has been created. Has that issued significant opinions that are changing 
the patent law? 
 MR. HE: They are planning to do so. The Chief Judge declared that this court is 
going to make lots of landmark decisions. That’s his stated intention. They recently issued 
their first precedential decision on the availability of summary judgment. So they are start-
ing to make that happen. 
MR. MEHTA: Other questions from the panel? 
MS. GE: I don’t know if now is the best time to be an IP lawyer in China, but it 
must be the most interesting time, given the flurry of new measures, new rules, and new 
amendments we have seen in the past four or five months, starting last December. It is 
challenging to keep up to date on all the developments. 
In terms of the question to what extent this is linked to the trade war, I think it 
might be helpful to look at the changes. He Jing mentioned the change in the Technology 
Import and Export Regulation7 in which the provisions that were included in the Trump 
Administration's Section 301 Report were revoked. 
 
6 Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory. 
7 Measures for the Administration of Registration of Technology Import and Export 
Contracts of the People's Republic of China, Decree of the Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China [2009] No. 3, issued December 30, 2001, effective January 1, 
2002 (repealing the Measures for the Administration of Technology Import and Export 
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In addition to that, China also passed the landmark Foreign Investment Law. Arti-
cle 22 of the law says that “No administrative agency in China shall force technology trans-
fer.” This headlined forced transfer of technology issue had been going on for close to a 
year, and there is now a law in China ensuring the principle of no forced technology trans-
fer. 
As a practitioner, I think in China oftentimes the devil is in the details. After this 
flurry of new rules and new amendments, what will happen next and in practice is still 
unclear, and we’ll have to wait to see. Hopefully, positive things will happen. 
QUESTION [Clarissa Allen, Global Affairs Canada]: Thanks for your presenta-
tion. You had on your last slide “Benchmarking on USMCA IP provisions.” Could you 
speak more about what you mean by that, if there are any provisions in particular? 
 MR. HE: I was referring more to regulatory data protection (RDP) in China. In 
the recent draft RDP rules, the maximum time they give to the RDP is twelve years. If I 
remember correctly, in USMCA the RDP is for ten years. If China can really match that 
and eventually that becomes a law, that will actually be even better than the USMCA stand-
ard. 
MR. MEHTA: We are out of time. We can come back to that very interesting 
thread during the discussion. Matching the Chinese system and these improvements to the 
USMCA standards, as well as other regional trade agreement standards, would be some-
thing certainly I would be interested in hearing more about from the panel. 
We will now move on to Spring Chang’s presentation. 
MS. CHANG: I’m Spring Chang from Chang Tsi & Partners, a Beijing law firm. 
My topic is how to deal with the large numbers of trademark squatters in China. I will 
introduce three topics: squats’ trademarks; IPR owners’ strategy; and how to enforce your 
rights if copycats actually use your mark. 
China is a huge market. China has a huge population. It has a very large amount of 
consuming ability, but it is also very famous for its copycats.  
Squats’ trademarks: We do have in China ADIDAS; we have LETO, we have KFC; 
even FACEBOOK when combined with Peking Opera.  
This is just one piece of the entire counterfeit issue. It is not that interesting. It 
could be interesting for us, but it would not be interesting for the true trademark owners 
that are really concerned about dilution and market share. In China average people don’t 
speak English, and sometimes that really can create a confusing situation. When your mark 
is misused, and even successfully applied in some relevant class, you really have a big 
concern in China especially when we have some clients who when they want to enter the 
China market see a similar mark like this. So you need a very strong strategy to protect IP 
rights. 
Strategy of IPR Protection in China: If your trademark is pirated in China, what is 
your responding strategy? Basically, there is a four-part strategy:  
(1) Know the differences between the Chinese and U.S. trademark laws, even the 
laws of other countries.  
• China has very special, very unique examination criteria. China has a subclass 
practice, so you cannot claim class hiding for protection.  
• The Chinese-version mark is very, very important. For example, in China we 
would not say “Apple cellphone,” we would say “píng guǒ.” That’s our language. So when 
you say, “I just have an English mark and I want to launch it everywhere in the world,” in 
China you have to seriously consider the Chinese version of your official trademark. We 
 
Contracts Registration (Decree No. 17, 2001 of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation) (China).  
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have sometimes experienced that a company that wants to enter China will launch the Chi-
nese-version and the English-version trademarks together. 
• China has a file-first versus a use-first system. I do know some big companies 
when they are filing globally file the same version, same specification of goods, not only 
in the United States but also in other countries like China. But in China, because there is a 
very special practice, you really need to consider that the Chinese version has all the Chi-
nese and local subclasses covered and all the corresponding uses. So it’s actually, at least 
I think according to our experience, a totally different final strategy when you are consid-
ering China. 
Also, the cost for filing copycat trademarks is very low. An individual copycat can 
file a bundle of trademarks for about $100 and then can consider how to sell them to you 
for a good price. So that’s a very different world. 
(2) You should know the examination criteria of the Chinese Trademark Office. In 
Hong Kong or in Taiwan, the application examiners usually check online to see whether 
some other party owns a similar mark, and they can easily do this. Examiners may ask, 
“Why are you filing this application because it seems to me this belongs to some other 
party?”  
But in China the examiners just make some kind of a clearance search to see 
whether there is a mark similar to yours. If not, they will allow the application to go 
through. This means even if you as the owner of SKECHERS don’t file an application but 
someone else files, the examiners will not search online to check whether you are the true 
owner or not; they will simply give the registration to the copycat. That is a very different 
examination criterion because the examiner will say, “If you’re saying you are the true 
right owner, you can a file an opposition to recover your right at a later stage.” 
(3) Audit-Filing to support for defensive purpose and filing for future use. We do 
know lots of companies, especially U.S. companies, that own Chinese registrations from 
ten years ago. At that time maybe we didn’t have subclasses. The Chinese version was not 
that important. It was not a prosperous market. When you use the mark for ten years and 
then you want to enter the China market, it’s very, very important to audit your existing 
rights in terms of the Chinese version, in terms of subclass. So audit work is always very, 
very important. 
(4) Non-use Cancellation, Opposition & Invalidation. How can you recover your 
trademark and win back the copycat trademark? There are different procedures based on 
bad faith, based on prior right like a prior right such as copyright, and based on well-known 
status. As long as you can establish that, for example, the copy of your logo for which you 
have a copyright in China was done in bad faith, if during the investigation you produce 
some evidence, and as long as you can establish that your trademark is well-known, you 
can win the trademark back. It is not a very difficult procedure.  
According to our experience, the chances of success for invalidation have been 
increasing for the past three to five years. I would say five years ago it was only around 10 
percent; but now, according to official data, the average success rate is around 30 percent 
for oppositions and 40 percent for invalidation. It is still pretty high if you have very good 
evidence. 
In this connection a footnote is that evidence of use in the United States doesn’t 
work. You have to provide evidence of use in mainland China, or at least in Hong Kong. 
Rubbermaid is a very vivid practical case example. Rubbermaid registered its 
trademark in Class 21 for some containers for washing and household purposes, toilet uten-
sils, and things like that. The mark they filed years ago just covered products in subclasses 
2102 and 2111 in Class 21. Also, at a very similar time, the examiner approved a registra-
tion filed by a Chinese individual also in Class 21 for combs, brush goods, scrubbing 
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brushes, etc., covered in subclass 2107. This is a rare case where when you choose to file 
an application and you only cover a very narrow scope based on your actual use, it is very 
likely that some copycat can find a gap in the same class, in some subclass, and then register 
the copycat trademark.  
Many companies have registered the Chinese version of their trademarks, includ-
ing Mead Johnson, Acuvue, Eclairs, and Motilium. Some they registered from the very 
beginning. Some we actually handled for them by buying the trademark back through ne-
gotiations, through invalidation. It requires less effort to get the trademark back if it was 
owned from the very beginning. We would say it is better to consider your Chinese version 
from the very beginning, even though it is easy to overlook, and you will have a solution 
to recover that. It could be very costly for you to only think of registering the Chinese 
version of your mark at a later stage. 
This is another case example of why the copyright protection is very important. 
We can see for Skechers and for the Coach design that even if you have a prior copyright, 
you can still stop others from registering the trademark in a relevant class, like Class 28 for 
roller skates or Class 24 for bed sheets. That is the rare case where if some copycat has 
registered your trademark in some relevant class or some remote class, as long as you have 
registered your Chinese copyright, you can recover that trademark very quickly. 
A well-known mark enjoys cross-class protection in China and a well-known mark 
is recognized on a case-by-case basis. There are four ways to have a trademark recognized 
as well-known. You can establish well-known status through opposition, invalidation, 
enforcement action, or even through litigation.  
In terms of enforcement, there are three very straightforward strategies you can 
use, depending on the nature of the target, whether they’re big or small. T 
The work steps for lawyers in China: find the right case and accumulate evidence. 
On the right side you can see there are many well-known trademarks established in China 
through opposition or litigation cases, but that’s the rarer case. 
MR. MEHTA: Great. I know the full presentation will be posted on the Fordham 
IP Institute’s website. 
I really enjoyed your presentation and all the representative marks that you 
showed. I found the Facebook one very interesting. It was unnecessarily glum and dour. I 
would have expected the bad-faith trademark to be an emoji or something happier or a cat 
picture or something to that effect.  
I have one question to kick off the discussion. He Jing spoke about the new amend-
ment to the Trademark Law changing from first-to-file to first-to-use, which you briefly 
touched on. Are you familiar with that, and what are your thoughts about how that is going 
to play out in the coming weeks and months? 
MS. CHANG: This is also in the background of the trade war. There is severe 
punishment for bad-faith applications. The local agencies have responsibilities to track the 
bad faith of the applicant when they file an application on behalf of a local company. We 
think this is a fairer way to give the right owners a very easy way to clear trademarks. We 
think it’s a good direction. 
MR. MEHTA: Great, thanks.  
Any other questions from our panelists on what I think has been a very important 
topic for a lot of U.S. businesses for a long time? 
MS. GE: I have a question. Why do we have so many bad-faith registrations in 
China? Is it because of government subsidy for filing trademarks? 
MS. CHANG: Because the cost is very low. There is no limit to the end date to file 
application. The cost for filing an application is very low, $100–200. If you lose, you lose; 
if you win the registration, you just wait to sell it back to the owner. China is a huge market 
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and there are lots of gaps. You can never sue a squatter for filing another’s trademark in 
bad faith. You can clear the mark through legal procedure, but there is no monetary com-
pensation; the copycat will pay zero money. 
MS. GE: Can we penalize these bad trademark agencies, file suit against them? Is 
that possible now? 
MS. CHANG: We have new guidelines for trademark agencies. If you know that 
the trademark is not being filed for the purpose of use, you cannot file on their behalf. This 
is a very new regulation that came out a couple of days ago. 
But it is very difficult unless you have instructions from the client that they want 
to file several hundred. If they want to file only one, you are really not in the position to 
obtain evidence of use. It could be tricky. We will just wait to see how that is enforced. 
MR. STRONSKI: I have a related question about a situation that I’ve had to deal 
with very recently. I represent a client in the financial area. There’s a watch company that 
has registered my client’s mark in China not only for watches but for all kinds of things 
unrelated to watches. It is a famous mark for watches. If they were registered in any sub-
class related, for example, to insurance or anything financial related, they could block us, 
even though they are not using it. My sense is that is not an uncommon problem in China, 
that there are people who file in subclasses that far exceed what they actually use the mark 
for but, because they haven’t had to prove use, they are able to block others from entering 
those markets. That is my perception. I don’t know if it’s true, but if it is true, what do we 
do about it? 
MS. CHANG: Actually it’s a very common practice. I saw even in the 1990s lots 
of Japanese companies file their key trademark logos, both the Chinese version and the 
English version, in all forty-five classes to give them blocking power. We call this a defen-
sive trademark. It is filed for many different classes where they have no intent to use the 
mark. 
It is still very popular right now in China because people are tired of filing so many 
oppositions and they really want to fill all the gaps. I think that is something you should 
consider if you have enough budget. This is one choice. Even now it works because when 
you file full class application you significantly reduce your opposition cost, so on balance 
you save a lot of money. 
Second, you need to build a monitoring system so that you can watch who files 
applications in your relevant class and you can file opposition or invalidation. There is the 
scenario where you obtain a prior copyright, you investigate and find bad faith, and then 
you build a case and win opposition/invalidation. That depends on the situation. Where 
you don’t have so many copycats, you file several oppositions every year. That works. 
MR. MEHTA: I know there’s a question from the audience. Although we are out 
of time, I’ll exercise my moderator’s privilege because I know you have been patiently 
waiting. 
QUESTION [Christian Liedtke, acuminis LLP, Costa Mesa]: Jill actually teed up 
the question that I wanted to ask all of the Chinese participants on the panel. The legislative 
change we’ve heard about so far is very much inward-facing in that it changes Chinese IP 
laws. One of the concerns that the U.S. side has, including U.S. brand owners, is that there 
is a stark influx of trademark applications in the United States coming from Chinese filers, 
and that is at least partially attributed to government subsidies from the various provinces. 
I’m curious; are these subsidies still continuing? Is there any trend that they will be 
stopped? What’s the status on those? 
MR. MEHTA: Perhaps we can have a quick response and then we can deal with 
the rest of this very important topic later during discussion. 
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 MR. HE: I think the Chinese government is now stopping that. The patent subsi-
dies are really stopping. There is a very heavy penalty now available. For trademarks, I’m 
not aware of local governments that are doing that, although Shenzhen is doing that because 
they have a lot of money. We’ll watch and see whether they will stop that anytime soon. 
MR. MEHTA: Great. We can touch back on this issue during our discussion time. 
To keep things moving, we will now move on to Jim Stronski, who will be talking 
about trade secret theft and other related matters. 
MR. STRONSKI: Thank you for staying. My topic is related to the current Chi-
nese–U.S. dispute. I’m focused on trade secrets, and there are some very interesting related 
activities that have happened in the last year or so. I want to focus on two policies of the 
Chinese government that are well known.  
Made in China 2025 is on its face a legitimate industrial policy and an important 
one for China to modernize manufacturing such that computers, jet engines, airplanes, 
things of high value, dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips, are made in China, 
manufactured in China and not necessarily imported from South Korea, Japan, Europe, and 
the United States. 
The way that’s done is there are subsidies that are focused on foreign investment 
that is buying companies that have IP. In 2016 $45 billion was spent by U.S. companies 
alone, mobilizing all of the State-backed and State-owned enterprises to focus on this; as 
well as the forced transfer agreements that we talked about earlier. 
The other interesting program is called the Thousand Talents Program. It was insti-
tuted in 2008, again for quite an apparently legitimate reason: to encourage people of 
Chinese heritage or Chinese citizens who are studying abroad who have skills, who are 
successful, who are entrepreneurs, who are scientists in businesses, who are PhDs at 
universities, to come back: “Come home. We’ll pay you” — sometimes large amounts of 
money — “to set up businesses here.” The U.S. government, in an unclassified intelligence 
assessment, characterizes this as a goal “to facilitate the legal and illicit transfer of U.S. 
technology, IP, and know-how.”  
This program is the focus of recent U.S. government and DOJ8 activity. The June 
2018 Report of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, entitled “How 
China’s Economic Aggression Threatens Technologies and Intellectual Property of the 
United States and the World” said: “The ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ … targets scholars who 
are leaders in their respective fields with top-level research capabilities, and who may hold 
intellectual property rights … desired by China. These recruits may receive lucrative and 
prestigious positions at premier Chinese research institutes, labs or universities.” 
The Report says that the policy since 2009 has been, based on Chinese government 
data, reasonably successful: 44,000 highly skilled Chinese personnel have returned; more 
than 300 entrepreneurial parks have been established for students returned from overseas; 
and more than 24,500 enterprises have been set up in these parks by over 67,000 overseas 
returnees, according to China Daily. So this program seems to have been successful from 
the Chinese perspective. 
From the U.S. government perspective, though — the Obama Administration was 
involved in this also — last November the Department of Justice declared a “China 
Initiative,”9 to focus resources on the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft by 
 
8 Department of Justice. 
9 See generally Jeff Sessions, Attorney General at Department of Justice, Announcement 
of New Initiative to Combat Chinese Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-
combat-chinese-economic-espionage. 
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Chinese entities. Inspired perhaps by The Who, the then (no longer) Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions said, “We’re not going to take it anymore.” 
Christopher Wray, the then (and now) FBI Director, said, “No country presents a 
broader, more severe threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security than 
China. The Chinese government is determined to acquire American technology, and 
they’re willing to use a variety of means to do that — from foreign investments, corporate 
acquisitions, and cyber intrusions, to obtaining the services of current or former company 
employees to get inside information.” I’m going to talk about a couple of recent cases 
where you see both of those fact scenarios. 
The tools the government has are many, but the most important ones are the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA),10 which has two sections: Section 1831: “trade secret 
theft is one to benefit a foreign government or its instrumentality,” and Section 1832: Trade 
secret theft for economic advantage, whether or not to benefit foreign government, or its 
instrumentality, or agent where that need not be proven.” 
There are significant penalties under the EEA: 
• Imprisonment and fines. 
• Significantly, there is a restitution; if there’s money that’s obtained, you can get 
a judgment in restitution. 
• Criminal forfeiture of what was used in the theft as well as what was taken.  
This again is prosecuted by the FBI. 
There has been a significant increase in focus on this going way back. In the period 
2009-2013 the number of investigations increased by 60 percent. More than half of the 
prosecutions since 2013 have been China-focused and China-linked. Again, the focus on 
Chinese bad acts, from the perspective of the U.S. government, is even greater now since 
this China Initiative. 
There are a bunch of interesting cases which I want to touch on briefly. The United 
States v. Zheng/Zhang11 case was decided by the Northern District of New York. Zheng is 
a U.S. citizen, an MIT-trained engineer, working at GE on steam turbines. He and his 
nephew in China created two companies and transferred a lot of technology from GE to 
the Chinese companies. 
The indictment identifies Made in China 2025 as something that incentivized this 
activity and said that the Chinese Five-Year Plan also was focused specifically on the de-
velopment of aviation and gas turbine projects. According to the indictment, you can tell 
they obtained at least a RMB 50 million grant from the provincial government to set up 
these companies to manufacture jet engines and turbines. It was part-subsidy and part-loan. 
In their communications, Zheng, the one in the United States, told his nephew that 
he had heard that you could get RMB 5 million to set up a business with U.S. information 
data; and his nephew said, “Actually for turbines it’s 6 million.” 
They met with the Chinese provincial government and made representations that 
they had met with experts in China and that, based on that technology exchange, “We gave 
more clarity on China’s current state of technical capabilities in terms of building jet 
engines and remained confident in our [i.e. GE’s] world-leading know-how.” 
This is one interesting case from last week. 
U.S. v. Xiaorong You aka Shannon You and Liu Xiangchen12 is a case decided in 
 
10 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
11 Government’s Motion for Discovery, U.S. v. Zheng/Zhang, (No. 1:19-cr-00156), 2019 
WL 2290758 (2019). 
12 U.S. v. Xiaorong You, No. 2:19-CR-14, 2019 WL 2426659 (E.D. Tenn. June 10, 
2019). 
Session 4C 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc. 714/960-4577 
12 
February 2019 by the Eastern District of Tennessee involving Ms. You, an engineer who 
had access to technology being developed by seven different companies because she was 
a contract manufacturer at one place as well as working at another since 1992 in BPA and 
BPA-free coating technologies. She has a Ph.D. in Polymer Science and Engineering from 
Lehigh University. She allegedly conspired with Liu Xiangchen who worked for a Chinese 
company that was interested in developing BPA-free coating technologies for food and 
beverage containers. It includes claims under § 1832. 
The indictment identifies The Thousand Talents program, designed to “induce 
individuals with advanced technical education, training and experience residing in Western 
countries to return or move to China and use their expertise to promote China’s economic 
and technological development.” It also identifies a similar Shandong Province-sponsored 
program entitled “Yishi-Yiyi.” 
 The conspiracy was for them to transfer these trade secrets to Chinese Company 
1 in exchange for the company supporting their applications to these two programs to get 
the grants from the national government and the provincial government. Then they were 
going to transfer the trade secrets to a second company, and the second company was going 
to enter into an agreement with an Italian company that was manufacturing first-generation 
BPA-free coatings. Once they had some credibility in the marketplace that they could suc-
ceed with this joint venture, they were going to come out with a second-generation product 
based on the U.S. trade secrets.  
U.S. v. Huawei Device Co., Ltd., and Huawei Device USA, Inc. is an interesting 
case. The January 16, 2019 indictment13 out of the Western District of Washington 
involved various Huawei engineers who were allegedly stealing T-Mobile trade secrets on 
hardware and software of a robot named “Tappy” that was used to evaluate the reliability 
of cell phones before being sold by T-Mobile. They asked T-Mobile for technical 
specifications, but T-Mobile said “No, because you’ll sell these phones to our competitors.” 
Huawei then sent its engineers in, who purportedly were going to use the robot to test their 
own phones, but they took pictures and measurements and stole the robot’s arm; they did 
a lot of things they shouldn’t have done. It includes claims under § 1832. Then, when they 
were caught, Huawei lied about it and created a false report saying that they had 
investigated it and it was two employees acting on their own, when in fact they were being 
instructed by the engineers in China. 
There are some other recent cases in the materials that are interesting, too. In 
addition to these cases, this was an issue in the Obama Administration, which prosecuted 
as well. 
To conclude, my question is: Are these legitimate industrial policies; are they pol-
icies designed to obtain foreign IP by fair or unfair means; or are they both? 
MR. MEHTA: Thanks, Jim. I think these materials again will also be uploaded to 
the conference website for those of you who are interested in further information. 
One question to kick off the discussion. Jim, there’s obviously a number of cases 
at the criminal prosecution level. Apart from the things that the U.S. government is doing 
in its Section 301 investigation, are you aware of any other systemic initiatives? I think 
your presentation suggests this is somewhat of a pattern. Is there anything else that you 
think the government should do that it is not already doing? 
MR. STRONSKI: I think the Obama Administration — you might know this better 
than me — came to some agreement with China to reduce the amount of hacking, and I 
think that actually did reduce a little bit the amount of hacking. 
 
13 Indictment, U.S. v. Huawei Device Co., Ltd., and Huawei Device USA, Inc., (No. 
CR19-010) (2019). 
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One of my cases I didn’t have time to discuss involved ten provincial intelligence 
officers being prosecuted — obviously in absentia — for hacking into the computer sys-
tems of thirteen aviation companies in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. 
That is being prosecuted now.  
So I think the culture has to change. I don’t know if an agreement is going to solve 
the problem. It is a big problem. 
In addition, there is a civil provision. You can bring a civil lawsuit for trade secret 
misappropriation. Until recently a lot of the criminal cases began that way before the plain-
tiffs got the government involved. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Jim, you paint a very dire picture. I have seen surveys about 
theft of trade secrets in China and in other countries. The surveys and the analysis that I’ve 
seen over the last five to ten years show that Chinese companies are becoming better and 
more effective at protecting trade secrets. Is that something that is consistent with what you 
have seen? 
MR. STRONSKI: I think you’re talking about two different things. One is, can you 
protect trade secrets in China? 
MR. BOLLINGER: Right. 
MR. STRONSKI: The other is whether there is an effort to modernize and upgrade 
the kind of manufacturing that is done in China. Either intentionally or unintentionally — 
maybe it’s not the government’s intention to do this — the government’s policies are 
incentivizing trade secret theft. The government has the goods on these people in terms of 
the communications and everything that took place, it would appear, and so these things 
are happening and they seem to be incentivized by these policies. 
At the same time, it appears that the Chinese ability to protect trade secrets and IP 
in China has improved and is continuing to improve. So this seems to be a problem that is 
difficult to solve but should be part of the discussions — and I’m sure is part of the discus-
sions — going on now between the countries. 
MR. MEHTA: Other comments from the panel? 
MR. HE: I just want to add a comment. When I listen to all this, it’s obvious it 
doesn’t make the Chinese look good. 
MR. STRONSKI: That wasn’t my intent. 
MR. HE: Let me say a few words about the Chinese way of looking at the trade 
secret problem and the American way of looking at the trade secret problem. Many people 
in China think that the U.S. view about the Chinese government systematically incentiviz-
ing trade secret theft is definitely untrue. The Chinese perception about the American 
reaction is that lots of Americans really have this kind of view out of fear or thinking, 
China grew way too quickly. This was unfair. There may be something definitely wrong 
with it. 
But the Chinese view is that of course there are some individuals, some businesses, 
or even maybe some local government leaders, who did something crazy, but there is really 
no systematic effort at the government level to say, “Hey, we want to send a thousand 
students or scholars to the United States to steal trade secrets.” That would be plainly stu-
pid. 
MR. MEHTA: Thank you very much. 
Now our final presentation, Jim Bollinger. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Thank you. My name is Jim Bollinger. I’m going to be talking 
about alternative dispute resolution involving agreements and relationships between Chi-
nese and U.S. companies. 
Several years ago, I represented a Chinese telecom company in a case involving 
Microsoft in the Southern District of New York. What shocked me at the beginning of the 
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case is that their attitude — they didn’t actually explicitly say this — was they just didn’t 
trust that they would get a fair shake here in New York. They ended up doing quite well 
and were happy with the outcome of the case. However, I was surprised at that attitude, 
although maybe I shouldn’t have been. 
In any event, I am going to talk about the pharma area. There are a number of 
different types of arrangements between Chinese and U.S. companies — joint development 
programs, contract manufacturing, and license agreements on technology and technology 
transfer. The U.S. companies fear that they are giving up technology and they want to be 
able to protect it and incentivize their counterparts in China to respect their trade secrets. 
We see that there is some concern about that moving forward. 
If there is a dispute, how does it get resolved? There are a number of options. 
The first thing you can do is you can go to the Southern District of New York, 
bring an action, and get a judgment against a Chinese company. However, the way current 
Chinese law looks at that judgment makes it very, very difficult to try to collect a monetary 
award for a violation. Therefore, this is really not considered a practical way of proceeding 
for most U.S. companies engaging in these agreements. 
You could litigate in China. As we’ve heard, the Chinese judicial system is going 
through dramatic changes. It is a civil law system. They do have very good facilities and 
judges. I think this is becoming a more attractive option going forward if there is a dispute 
that results in a monetary award that either the U.S. company or the Chinese company is 
looking to collect. Of course, a Chinese court award could be enforced in China, as you 
might imagine. 
Another choice is you could do arbitration in China, and there is a very good 
facility for doing that. There are issues associated with that with which U.S. companies 
might not be comfortable. It is very tightly controlled and not much different than a civil 
proceeding in the court systems in China, and in fact closely parallels court proceedings, 
but you do get to collect your award if you’re successful at the end of the day. 
You could choose alternative dispute resolution in China. One of the things that’s 
nice about arbitration in China is you could get interim relief if there is need for that. There 
are other facilities there. 
Again, there is recognition in China of the ability to collect an ADR14 award, like 
in any civil action, because at the end of the day there is the inherent belief that in any 
dispute you want to find a neutral ground to resolve it.  
In my experience — and my experience in particular has been in UK-based arbi-
tration as a vehicle to resolve disputes between U.S. and Chinese companies, and certainly 
more broadly perhaps Western and Asian companies, that have come to an impasse other-
wise — the benefit of using ADR is that both parties will consider it relatively neutral and 
objective. They know the rules going in. There are facilities that have been in place for a 
very long time. 
The one that I have experience with, the London Court of International Arbitration, 
has been around for over a century, and has a lot of the cross-border confidence that is 
necessary for parties to engage and feel comfortable that they are going to get a fair shake 
at the end of the day. 
 Arbitration has been criticized because of the expense associated with it. I’m not 
familiar specifically with any comparative analysis of costs. Quite frankly, the London 
Court of Arbitration is very assertive that they are the least expensive of all the various 
forums that you can go to. They promote it in their own material. Our experience has been 
relatively consistent with these types of results, so I think it does provide a low-cost reso-
 
14 Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
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lution and an effective tool for resolving disputes between two companies, one in China 
and one in the United States. 
Of course, the nice thing about it, as opposed to a judgment from a U.S. court, is 
that the Chinese are a signatory to the arbitration agreements that allow for collection and 
enforcement. Obviously, every country reserves rights to examine and challenge awards 
notwithstanding such agreements, but they are limited, and in fact the low refusal rate is 
low. In 2013–2015 only 0.14 percent of awards were actually refused enforcement. 
It’s always good if you’re interested in pursuing arbitration to make sure your 
agreements are in place that allow for effective resolution of a dispute if it ends up going 
into arbitration. I have highlighted some of the high-level things that need to be considered 
in terms of choice of law and subject matter for the arbitration. These are conventional 
terms that are fairly universal, but they should be made sure to be part of any sort of U.S. 
and Chinese agreement. 
That’s it. If anybody has any questions, I’d be glad to try to help. 
MS. CHANG: It really depends on the subject matter of the litigation. If it involves 
serious trademark or patent infringement, if you’re litigating directly in China you can 
conclude the litigation in six months if there is no appeal. If there is an appeal, it’s three 
more months. Infringement can be stopped very quickly. But if you choose to pursue arbi-
tration, it could be very time-consuming and it is costly. 
MR. BOLLINGER: I agree with that. In fact, I should have said at the beginning I 
am really talking about an agreement like a joint development agreement. 
If you are involved in a patent litigation, I think China now offers some very good 
avenues for quick recovery and enforcement of your patent rights in China. 
MS. CHANG: And for trademark as well. 
MR. BOLLINGER: Yes, trademark and patents. 
QUESTION [Patricia Martone, Law Office of Patricia Martone]: My question is 
about where you would choose to conduct the arbitration. I’m surprised that Chinese com-
panies wouldn’t prefer Hong Kong or Singapore to London as a place for arbitration. Can 
you comment on that? 
MR. BOLLINGER: The agreements usually dictate the location. If you have an 
agreement and you insist on London, I think Chinese companies are less unhappy with that 
as opposed to perhaps New York. But you’re right; I think obviously Hong Kong would 
be more comfortable time-wise. 
MS. GE: We do a lot of this type of inbound/outbound licensing and technology 
transfer work. From what we have observed in other parts of the world, I would say that 
99 percent of the time the agreement will include a dispute resolution clause based on 
arbitration. You will end up with arbitration in either Hong Kong or Singapore 85–85 per-
cent of the time. What happened in the past month is that Hong Kong and China have now 
entered into a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which allows for a Hong 
Kong-seated arbitration to obtain interim relief in China. To some extent now Hong Kong 
has this unique advantage compared to other venues, and we’ll see how that will be imple-
mented in the coming months and years. 
MR. BOLLINGER: I think that’s correct. 
MR. MEHTA: Any other questions? 
QUESTION [Thomas Pease, Quinn Emanuel]: Are U.S. attorneys allowed to par-
ticipate in Chinese arbitrations? 
MS. GE: Yes. 
MR. BOLLINGER: And obviously U.S. attorneys are allowed to participate in 
arbitrations in the United Kingdom. 
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I want to point out that in the case that involved a license dispute between a Chinese 
cellphone company and Microsoft there was no arbitration clause, and that’s why they 
ended up being sued in the Southern District of New York. 
MR. MEHTA: We’ve got a few minutes for general discussion on all of the panel 
presentations. 
QUESTION [Christian Liedtke, acuminis LLP, Costa Mesa]: I want to go back to 
back to Spring’s presentation and the issue of subclass claiming. You had up on the screen 
the Rubbermaid example. I think for once most of the lawyers in the room will be able to 
agree that even though the goods were in different subclasses, they were highly similar if 
not to say identical. 
I just want to get some clarification. Would the Chinese Trademark Office really 
let that mark go through? Would they not check what is in other subclasses and find a 
likelihood of confusion, which in this case was plainly obvious? 
MS. CHANG: China is number 1 in the world in terms of filing applications and 
we have at least 1000 examiners. We do now have straightforward examination criteria, 
strictly subclass by subclass. 
In terms of exceptions, if somebody files several hundred trademarks, they will 
reject that. They will challenge your intention. Otherwise, even if you file in different sub-
classes, they are the same class. They are allowed to coexist. Another examiner checks the 
purpose of the application. Even if they think there is a possibility that a Chinese individual 
is applying for a squat mark, their opinion would be that at a later stage you can file oppo-
sition and you can clear that then. So there is still a remedy available afterward. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Liedtke]: Interesting. A quick follow-up: are there any trends 
for that policy to change? 
MS. CHANG: As I said, China is number one in the world in terms of filing and 
there are 1000 examiners. We don’t think they have very sophisticated examination criteria 
based on you personally, so there are really very rigid examination criteria, which we call 
the classification catalog, strictly followed subclass-subclass, at least right now with 
respect to the situation. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Liedtke]: Thank you. 
MR. MEHTA: Other questions from the audience for any of our panelists for their 
presentations? 
[No response] 
Let me go back to a question on the USMCA that I’m also very interested in. On 
the issue of RDP and patent linkage compared to the emerging law in China, and also 
taking into account some of the regional standards that are also being negotiated, how has 
that come about? You talked about patent linkage in the new amendment. Again, was that 
more domestically driven? Is that more of an idea to promote and ensure that there is inno-
vation in China? I thought that was a very interesting development. 
 MR. HE: China is actually facing a very interesting dilemma. China traditionally, 
for political reasons, sees itself as a developing country, and there is a certain IP policy 
associated with that. 
But I would just say that with all these new developments China realizes that it has 
a huge potential for doing biopharmaceutical innovations and that a very powerful IP 
environment including RDP will be important to have long-term benefits. Also, China has 
a very strong public health policy agenda to make sure that Chinese patients get the very 
best drugs and medicines. That’s why China has announced this very ambitious plan com-
ing from policymakers at the highest level. That looks like it’s real.  
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If it was not done before, because of the U.S.–China trade dispute, if it had not 
become part of some weird political situation or personal situation, we would probably 
already have had this patent linkage and RDP in place. 
We know there are some very intense discussions currently that maybe China 
should look at this again. We should be thinking more in the next ten to twenty years about 
how we should protect not only the interests of China-based biopharmaceutical companies 
but also more R&D being done by U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies. The need 
to protect Chinese innovation in Asian, South American, and African countries is going to 
sooner or later become clear to China’s policymakers. 
To a large extent, Chinese IP policy should be more consistent, not just with 
respect to biopharmaceutical policy but also anti-piracy and lots of other areas, even trade-
mark. China’s IP policy should be more consistent with the U.S. IP policy. China has a 
huge amount of IP these days, whether it’s content, innovation, or brands. With the right 
IP environment this will accelerate. 
MS. GE: Just to supplement, I think patent linkage is definitely something that is 
driven from the inside. I think in China for the past ten or twenty years there has been no 
patent cliff, so after the expiration of a compound patent or after expiration of all the patents 
the innovators can still have premium pricing of pharmaceuticals. 
What has happened is now the Chinese government really wants drug prices to 
drop after expiration of the compound patent. This is part of the overall drug reform that 
has been going on in China for two or three years. In connection with that it is important 
to introduce the patent linkage system. Surprisingly, this is something that was first raised 
by CFDA, the Chinese regulator of pharmaceuticals. 
As practitioners we have been waiting to see how the drug regulatory side and the 
patent side can work together so that we have a workable patent linkage system, which also 
takes into consideration how patent litigation is conducted in China. If you have the issues 
with bifurcation, I think by design it would be very difficult. But still we are hopeful, given 
the importance the government has in these issues, that we will have the patent linkage 
system and Chinese patients will have more access to affordable drugs. 
MR. MEHTA: We have reached happy hour. I would like you all to join me in 
thanking our wonderful panel. 
